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Reply to Dr. Tengs’ Response
Editors,
The primary aim of my article “Five-Hundred Life-Saving Interventions and Their Misuse in the Debate Over Regulatory Reform”1 was to
dispel the myth that had grown up around the studies Dr. Tammy Tengs
published with Dr. John Graham: that is, the idea that government regulation is responsible for, in Dr. Graham’s words, the “statistical murder”2 of
60,000 people in the United States every year. As I demonstrated in my
article, nothing in the work of Drs. Tengs and Graham supports Dr. Graham’s recurring charge of statistical murder through regulation. And nothing in Dr. Tengs’ response to my article casts doubt on this, my most important conclusion. I will discuss in sequence the comments Dr. Tengs
does provide in her response to my article.
First, Dr. Tengs responds to my observation that a large percentage of
the toxin controls included in their studies – indeed, seventy-nine out of
ninety of the toxin controls analyzed in their “Opportunity Costs” study –
were never mandated by a regulatory agency. Dr. Tengs implies that I
believe it is a general flaw of their work that they included unimplemented
life-saving measures in their analysis. I do not believe this. However, it
clearly is a mistake to refer to life-saving measures that were never undertaken as if they were undertaken. As I observe in my article, Dr. Graham
himself has made this mistake more than once.
In addition, it would also be a mistake to “reallocate” money from unimplemented programs to implemented ones. If, for example, Drs. Tengs
and Graham wrongly assumed that some unimplemented environmental
controls had in fact been implemented, and “reallocated” the costs of the
unimplemented programs, then the effect would have been to “take”
money from programs that were not in fact spending any money in order to
give it to other programs. In my article, this assertion had to remain little
more than speculation because Drs. Tengs and Graham declined to respond
to my requests for basic information about their research. While writing
my article, I asked Drs. Tengs and Graham what I thought was a quite
straightforward question: for the seventy-nine toxin controls that had not
1. Lisa Heinzerling, Five-Hundred Life-Saving Interventions and Their Misuse in the Debate Over
Regulatory Reform, 13 Risk: Health, Safety & Environment 151 (2002).
2. H.R. Comm. on Science, Risk Assessment and Cost Benefit Analysis, 104th Cong. 1124 (1995)
(written testimony of John D. Graham).
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been required by regulation, but that were included in their “Opportunity
Costs” study, what implementation rate had the authors assumed? Neither
author responded to my inquiry.
Despite Dr. Tengs’ renewed opportunity, in her response to my article,
to answer my basic question about her research, she still has not supplied
any specific response. For at least fifty-nine of the toxin controls, we do
know that the authors assumed an implementation rate of greater than zero
even though these very expensive controls were never mandated. We also
now know that Drs. Tengs and Graham concluded that at least some firms
have voluntarily undertaken toxin controls costing millions of dollars per
life saved. We are told that the basis for this questionable assumption was
“expert elicitation,” but we are told nothing about why the “experts”
viewed this conclusion as reasonable. Nor are we told which rules were
assumed to be voluntarily implemented and to what extent. Ironically, as
Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Dr.
Graham has warned agencies against accepting research results based on
just the kind of unavailable and irreproducible data on which his own studies appear to rely.
Dr. Tengs also defends the “Opportunity Costs” selection of 187 lifesaving interventions by saying that there is “no way of knowing whether
the 187 analyzed interventions are representative of the universe of lifesaving interventions.” This claim is mistaken. Ninety of the interventions
were toxin controls; of these ninety interventions, fully eighty-one arose
from statutory provisions that are either formally or effectively obsolete
and that were so even before Tengs and Graham’s studies were published.
For these interventions, at least, comprising almost half of the data set of
this study, the one thing we do know is that they are not representative of
the regulatory universe.
Second, Dr. Tengs defends the decision to limit her research to the opportunity costs of life-saving interventions, saying that this limit was most
sensible from a “scientific perspective.” It may well be true that Dr.
Tengs’ analysis was made more tractable and manageable by the decision
to limit the analytical universe, but it also remains true that many more
“statistical murders” would have been uncovered by extending their analysis to, say, the vast spending on government subsidies for resource extraction, military defense, and even consumer products. Indeed, the logic of
Drs. Tengs and Graham’s own research would imply that such an extension would make sense: after all, the very premise of their research is that
we should enlarge our range of vision to consider the opportunities we are
missing by spending resources the way we do now. If one were interested
in maximizing life-saving, one would think the last programs to be cut –
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rather than the first and only, as in Drs. Tengs and Graham’s research –
would be programs that save lives.
Third, Dr. Tengs observes that many non-environmental interventions
have benefits that were not captured in her analysis, and thus it is not clear,
she says, that the analysis is systematically skewed against environmental
interventions. I agree with the first point but am much less clear about the
second. Safety and medical interventions – which generally fare better
than environmental measures in Dr. Tengs’ analysis – have humans as their
central concern; helmet laws, for example, cannot by any stretch of the
imagination be described as ecologically beneficial. Environmental controls, in contrast, almost invariably protect both humans and ecosystems,
and thus a singular focus, in cost-effectiveness analysis, on human lives or
life-years saved will miss much of what environmental law is about.
Fourth, Dr. Tengs defends her studies’ assumption that not all human
lives are equally worth saving. As for the inequality inherent in considering life-years rather than lives saved, Dr. Tengs states that this approach
does not discriminate against the elderly because “an intervention that extends the life of an elderly person by five years would be treated the same
as one that extends the life of a young person by five years.” True enough,
but guess who mostly falls in the category of people whose lives can be
extended only five years? The elderly. And guess who mostly falls in the
category of young people whose lives can be extended only five years?
The sick. Both of these five-years-left-to-live groups will systematically
be deemed less worthy of life-saving interventions, under Dr. Tengs’ approach, than will the young and healthy. Dr. Tengs and others are free, of
course, to defend this kind of inequality as a matter of policy advocacy, but
they should keep in mind that the approach they are defending is not a scientific choice.
Dr. Tengs also defends her use of the technique of discounting, which
steeply devalues lives saved in the future compared to lives saved today.
She cites the findings of the U.S. Panel on Cost-effectiveness in Health and
Medicine as support for this methodology. Again, however, the decision
whether to treat lives saved in the future – including lives in future generations – differently from lives saved today is not a scientific choice; thus it
is not the kind of choice that an appeal to professional consensus will resolve. Tengs also wheels out the shopworn argument that discounting is
necessary because without it we will never spend a penny on life-saving,
but instead keep our life-saving money in the bank forever, watching it
accumulate interest for decades, even centuries, without ever spending it to
alleviate human suffering. This claim, formally known as the KeelerCretin paradox, is fantastical.
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With regard to discounting, Dr. Tengs also implies that it makes little
difference to the outcome of cost-effectiveness analyses because toxin controls save so few lives to begin with. In other research, however, I have
demonstrated that discounting future lives can increase the costs per life
saved of toxin controls by several orders of magnitude.3 Moreover, although Dr. Tengs is correct that many toxin controls are estimated to prevent only a handful of cancer cases, in many cases cancer prevention is not
the primary purpose of toxin control. In addition – and here we circle back
around to the beginning – most toxin controls that prevent, say, only a fraction of a cancer case, are the same toxin controls that have never been
mandated by any regulatory agency.
Finally, Dr. Tengs responds to my criticisms of John Graham’s misuse
of his own studies by saying that these issues were considered during the
hearings on Dr. Graham’s nomination to head the Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs. Indeed they were. And, after this airing of Dr.
Graham’s views, Dr. Graham’s nomination received thirty-seven negative
votes – more negative votes than any of President Bush’s other nominees
for offices relating to environmental regulation.
Lisa Heinzerling, Esq.*

3. Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 Yale L.J. 1981 (1998).
* Dr. Heinzerling is a professor of law at the Georgetown University Law Center in Washington,
DC. E-mail: heinzerl@law.georgetown.edu.

